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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel Chippewa appeals from the District Court's order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Mr. Chippewa argues that the district 
court erred when it summarily dismissed his post-conviction action without providing him 
an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he was represented by conflicted counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal action, Mr. Chippewa was charged with driving under 
the influence of alcohol (hereinafter, DUI) and a felony enhancement. (R., p.4D.) 
Mr. Chippewa was appointed trial counsel to represent him in that matter. (R., p.4D.) 
After trial counsel was appointed, she moved to withdraw as attorney of record based 
on a conflict arising from her prior prosecution of Mr. Chippewa and the potential that 
the State would use the conviction from that case as the basis for a sentencing 
enhancement. (R., p.4D.) The district court appointed new counsel. (R., p.4D.) 
Mr. Chippewa pleaded guilty to the felony DUI. (R., p.4D.) Thereafter, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with six years fixed, and placed him on 
probation. (R., pp.4D-41.) 
After a period of probation, Mr. Chippewa admitted that he violated the terms of 
his probation. (R., p.41.) Mr. Chippewa's probation was revoked and the criminal court 
retained jurisdiction. (R., p.41.) Upon review of Mr. Chippewa's period of probation 
(hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Chippewa 
on probation. (R., p.41.) The attorney who previously withdrew as counsel due to the 
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conflict represented Mr. Chippewa at the rider review hearing and throughout the 
remainder of the criminal proceedings. (R., p.41.) 
After a second period of probation, Mr. Chippewa admitted that he violated the 
terms of his probation. (R., p.41.) The district court revoked probation and executed 
Mr. Chippewa's prison sentence. (R., p.41.) Mr. Chippewa also filed an Idaho Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting leniency, which was denied by the district 
court. (R., pp.41-42.) 
Mr. Chippewa filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction relief, 
wherein he claimed that the district court did not consider a probation plan, and that he 
was denied due process during the probation violation process. (R., pp.4-5.) 
Mr. Chippewa also claimed his received ineffective assistance of counsel because a 
conflict of interest existed between him and his trial counsel. (R., pp.4-5.) 
Mr. Chippewa also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal from 
the order revoking probation and the order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.8-9.) 
The State filed motion for summary dismissal and a hearing was held on that 
motion. (R., pp.31-37.) At that hearing, it was determined that the State's motion for 
summary judgment was not filed in a timely manner. (Tr., p.8, Ls.19-21.) As such, the 
only facts considered by the district court were those contained in Mr. Chippewa's 
petition. (R., p.39.) Thereafter, the district court entered an order granting Mr. Chippewa 
post-conviction relief as to one claim: trial counsel's failure to file an appeal from the 
order revoking probation and the order denying the Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.38-49.) 
However, the district court summarily dismissed the remainder of his claims. 
(R., pp.38-49.) Mr. Chippewa timely appealed. (R., pp.51-54.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Chippewa's post-conviction 
claim that he was not represented by conflict free counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Chippewa's Post-Conviction 
Claim That He Was Not Represented By Conflict Free Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Chippewa alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because his trial counsel formerly prosecuted him on a charge and the resulting 
conviction was used as a charging enhancement in the criminal action at issue. 
Additionally, Mr. Chippewa alleged that a conflict existed as he could not communicate 
with his trial counsel about trial strategy. The district court found that there was not a 
conflict as trial counsel's former prosecution of Mr. Chippewa was not relevant to the 
district court's disposition of his probation violations and his Rule 35 motion, as the prior 
conviction used as a charging enhancement was only relevant during the initial guilt and 
sentencing proceedings. Mr. Chippewa argues that the conflict persisted throughout the 
criminal action as the facts relevant during the original sentencing hearing were also 
relevant during both the probation disposition and Rule 35 proceedings. 
B. Standard Of Review On Appeal 
In this case, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Chippewa's post-
conviction claim. Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never 
involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only 
determinations of law. Accordingly, this Court must review a district court's summary 
dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,402-03 (2006). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Chippewa's Post-
Conviction Claim That He Was Not Represented By Conflict Free Counsel 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is separate and 
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. 
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA), I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911, 
and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil 
proceeding, the petitioner must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition 
initiating a post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. 
A post-conviction petition is required to include more than "a short and plain statement 
of the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of 
the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must 
be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not 
attached." Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will 
be subject to dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,331 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment in other 
civil proceedings, the UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction 
petitions where there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and one party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c). "On review of a dismissal of 
a post-conviction application without an evidentiary hearing, [the court] must determine 
whether there are genuine issues of material fact." Jones v. State, 125 Idaho 294, 295 
(Ct. App. 1994). An appellate court will "determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
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exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with any 
affidavits." Id. "Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, 
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in 
favor of the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). The district 
court need not accept the petitioner's allegations which are clearly disproved by the 
record. Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360,368 (Ct. App. 1996). However, if a question of 
material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to 
resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331. 
In this case, Mr. Chippewa has alleged a post-conviction claim based on a theory 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States Constitution "guarantees a fair 
trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial 
largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). One such provision is the right to the 
assistance of counsel (U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to ... have the assistance of counsel for his defense.")), which has 
been interpreted as the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 685-86. "The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment 
as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 791 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims can be based on an alleged attorney-client conflict of interest. 
Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356,363-363 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Generally, there is a two-pronged test for determining whether an attorney has 
rendered ineffective assistance in contravention of a criminal defendant's right to 
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counsel. The threshold inquiry is whether counsel's performance was "deficient," i.e., 
whether it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," as judged "under 
prevailing professional norms." Id. at 687-91. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
held that under circumstances where trial counsel is operating under an actual conflict 
of interest, "the Strickland prejudice standard need not be met, but a petitioner still must 
demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Nevarez v. 
State, 145 Idaho 878, 885 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In this case, Mr. Chippewa set forth, and the district court relied on, the following 
facts to as the basis for his conflict-based ineffective assistance of counsel claim: 
Presumptive prejudice: counsel was [previously the] prosecutor in my 
case, she asked to withdraw, did so, but [then was] assigned again at the 
sentencing stage, creating [a] gross conflict of interest, against [my] 
objection. 
I objected to [trial counsel] being my counsel due to gross conflict of 
interest, her refusal to work with me, or raise any of my issues at 
sentencing. She was previously a prosecutor in my case, and prosecuted 
me for felony eluding, which was used against me in the new charges for 
misdemeanor [eluding allegations] in the probation violation on this new 
charge and sentence, which is very prejudicial to my best interests and 
due process. 
I assert that I objected to the appointment of the conflicted counsel. 
(R., p.45.) 
Since the State failed file an answer to the petition, failed to file a timely motion 
for summary judgment, and failed to appear at the hearing on its motion for summary 
judgment (R., pp.37-39), the only facts in the record pertaining to Mr. Chippewa's 
conflict claims are those contained in his petition. Since the district court summarily 
dismissed this claim and the State moved for summary judgment, the foregoing facts 
must be construed in a light most favorable for Mr. Chippewa. Va void, 148 Idaho at 45. 
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The district court initially addressed this issue by acknowledging that trial counsel 
was appointed to represent Mr. Chippewa, made the conflict known and was excused 
from the case. (R., p.45.) The district court then noted that the same attorney 
represented Mr. Chippewa after he completed his rider and throughout the remainder of 
the trial proceedings. (R., p.45.) However, the district court concluded that no conflict 
existed because the issues relevant to the final probation violation disposition, whether 
Mr. Chippewa had violated his probation and whether his probation should be revoked, 
were unrelated to the trial counsel's former prosecution of Mr. Chippewa. (R., p.45.) 
The district court then addressed trial counsel's representation of Mr. Chippewa 
during the Rule 35 proceedings and concluded that his "prior conviction played a minor 
role, if any, in the denial of [Mr. Chippewa's] Rule 35 motion." (R., p.46.) The district 
court reasoned that the execution of his sentence was a result of his present conduct 
and that trial counsel's role in attempting to reduce his sentence "did not present a 
conflict of interest." (R., p.46.) 
The district court erred in holding that trial counsel's conflict only existing during 
the initial guilt and sentencing proceedings. The Idaho Rules of Professional 
Reasonability set forth the basic rules governing conflicts of interest. State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88,98 (1998). The relevant rule 1.7 states in part: 
(a) ... a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
I,R.P.R. 1.7. 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to ... a former client .... 
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Other than the foregoing rule, Mr. Chippewa is not aware of any controlling 
authority which addresses the question at issue. However, there is persuasive authority 
which can be used to provide guidance. In United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937 
(7th Cir. 1989), Ziegenhagen was appointed a defense attorney that, twenty years 
earlier, was a prosecutor that appeared at a sentencing hearing and recommended the 
sentence imposed against Ziegenhagen in an unrelated matter. Id. at 938. That earlier 
conviction was a predicate conviction for a sentencing enhancement in the case for 
which trial counsel represented Ziegenhagen. Id. Prior to sentencing in the new case, 
Ziegenhagen's trial counsel realized his involvement in the older case. Id. at 939. Trial 
counsel discussed the possibility of a conflict with Ziegenhagen and the current 
prosecutor. Id. The prosecutor did not think there was a conflict and Ziegenhagen 
remained silent as to the issue. Id. The district court then applied the sentencing 
enhancement, and Ziegenhagen appealed. Id. at 
On appeal, trial counsel continued to represent Ziegenhagen and, all after all of 
the briefing was filed, Ziegenhagen filed a pro se motion requesting the appointment of 
new counsel based on an alleged conflict of interest stemming from trial counsel's 
former role as Ziegenhagen's prosecutor. Id. The Tenth Circuit employed the following 
rationale in resolving this issue: 
In this case, the prosecutorial role that Ziegenhagen's counsel took in the 
earlier convictions was substantial enough to represent an actual conflict 
of interest. Although he was not the prosecuting attorney of record, he 
appeared at the sentencing hearing to recommend the length of sentence 
in the convictions for burglary and robbery, the convictions used to 
enhance Ziegenhagen's present sentence. 
This former representation amounted to an actual conflict of interest 
and we have been given notice of it. Despite the fact that Ziegenhagen 
had been convicted by a jury of the present offense, that does not mean 
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that [trial counsel] could not decide his defense strategy either at 
sentencing or on appeal on the basis of the conflict. Needless to say, 
there may be countless ways in which the conflict could have hindered a 
fair trial, the sentencing hearing or even this appeal. We cannot say that 
there was nothing another attorney could have argued based on the 
record to more zealously advocate on this defendant's behalf. Thus, we 
presume Ziegenhagen was prejudiced by Hanson's representation. 
Id. at 940-941 (citations omitted). 
The facts of this case are substantially similar to those in Ziegenhagen. Here, as 
in Ziegenhagen, trial counsel previously prosecuted Mr. Chippewa in a prior action, the 
conviction used as the basis for an enhancement in the current criminal action. In 
Ziegenhagen, the Tenth Circuit concluded that such a role constituted an actual conflict 
of interest. However, a finding that a conflict exists in Mr. Chippewa's case is more 
compelling than in Ziegenhagen because trial counsel in this case was the prosecuting 
attorney of record (R., p.44), while in Ziegenhagen trial counsel only appeared at the 
sentencing hearing to make the sentencing recommendation. Ziegenhagen, 890 at 
940-941. 
Mr. Chippewa recognizes that in Ziegenhagen trial counsel represented 
Ziegenhagen during the initial guilt phase and sentencing phases, while in this case trial 
counsel represented Mr. Chippewa during probation revocation proceedings. Although 
Mr. Chippewa agrees that the difference between the procedural postures of the two 
cases does attenuate that conflict, that attenuation is very minimal and alone does not 
warrant summary dismissal, and an evidentiary hearing on this matter should have been 
held. 
Since trial counsel was conflicted for the purposes of the guilt and sentencing 
phases in this matter, that conflict persisted throughout the remainder of the 
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proceedings because the inquires which must be addressed by the district court during 
sentencing are substantially similar to those inquires which must be addressed by the 
court when determining whether to revoke probation or reduce a sentence after 
revoking probation. While the district court correctly determined that it should inquire 
into the question of whether Mr. Chippewa's recent behavior on probation was 
promoting his rehabilitation and societal protection, every time a district court revokes 
probation it must also consider whether it should exercise its inherent Rule 35 power to 
reduce the length of the defendant's sentence. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 
(Ct. App. 2003). This in turn requires the district court to consider events which 
occurred before and after the original judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 
(Ct. App. 2009). In fact, the Court of Appeals has presumed that a district court will 
consider such events. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As 
such, in order for trial counsel to effectively strategize about the appropriate mitigating 
factors to present to the court at the probation disposition hearing, trial counsel had to 
evaluate whether there were mitigating circumstances surrounding the prior offenses 
used to enhance Mr. Chippewa's DUI from a misdemeanor to a felony. One of those 
offenses happened to be one that trial counsel acted as prosecutor. Therefore, trial 
counsel was put in a position of potentially advocating against a prior conviction she 
procured for her former client, the State. This is a conflict as there was a significant risk 
that trial counsel's representations of Mr. Chippewa would be limited by trial counsel's 
responsibilities to her former client, the State. I.R.P.R. 1.7. Additionally, trial counsel 
was put into a position where she would have to consider undermining her own work 
when she previously procured Mr. Chippewa's conviction. 
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Further support for Mr. Chippewa's position that the nature of the original offense 
is important when determining the length of a sentence executed after a period of 
probation can be found in State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, 
Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 
21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the district court retained jurisdiction 
for 180 days. Id. After completing the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was 
placed on another period of probation, which was ultimately revoked. Id. The district 
court then sua sponte reduced the length of Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren 
then appealed and alleged that the district court should have further reduced the length 
of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, Mr. Warren argued that his probation 
violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating, 
"Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the probation violation by arguing that his 
violation was trivial. This Court must look at the nature of the original criminal offense, 
in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit off his victim's ear." Id. According to 
the Court of Appeals, the nature of the underlying offense and other pre-probationary 
circumstances must be analyzed when a district court executes a sentence after a 
period of probation. 
The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the role trial counsel played in her 
representation of Mr. Chippewa during the Rule 35 proceedings as the same factors 
were directly at issue. State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985); see also 
State v. Yarbrough, 106 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 1984)). Even the district court recognized 
that the conflict might have played a minor role during the Rule 35 proceedings. 
(R., p.46.) However, as in Warren, supra, the nature of the original offense played a 
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pivotal role in the analysis of whether Mr. Warren's sentence should have been 
reduced. In fact, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Warren's sentencing 
claim on appeal because he failed to provide the Court of Appeals with an appellate 
record of the original sentencing proceedings. Warren, 123 Idaho 21. As such, trial 
counsel's conflict was present and relevant to the issues related to her representations 
of Mr. Chippewa during the Rule 35 proceedings because the circumstances 
surrounding the nature of the original offense were directly at issue. 
Additionally, Mr. Chippewa's claim that a conflict existed was broad enough to 
include a conflict based on a breakdown of attorney client communication. In his 
petition, Mr. Chippewa alleged that, due to a gross conflict of interest, trial counsel 
refused to work with him and develop trial strategies for the probation disposition. 
(R., p.8.) Mr. Chippewa alleged additional facts supporting this conflict as trial counsel 
was asked and refused to provide him with discovery related to his probation violations. 
(R., p.9.) A conflict can be found in the event "the defendant's relationship with his or 
her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right would be 
violated but for substitution." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 596 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Here, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a conflict based 
on a breakdown in attorney client communications, as trial counsel refused to work with 
Mr. Chippewa and denied him access to the discovery related to his probation 
violations. (R., p.8.) As such, Mr. Chippewa was provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel as his attorney refused to work with him or provide him with the materials he 
needed to mount a defense to the alleged probation violations. Therefore, summary 
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dismissal of this claim was inappropriate as Mr. Chippewa alleged an issue of material 
fact and this claim should have been further developed at an evidentiary hearing. 
The next question in the analysis is whether trial counsel's conflict actually 
affected her performance. Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 885. Mr. Chippewa informed trial 
counsel that he did not want her representing him due to the conflicts in this case. 
(R., pp.8, 45.) Trial counsel's failure to inform the district court about these conflicts 
constituted deficient performance as that action would have triggered the trial court's 
duty to inquire into the conflicts and Mr. Chippewa lost his ability to present facts to the 
district court during said inquiry. Uppert, 145 Idaho at 594. Since trial counsel was 
operating under an actual conflict, her performance was also deficient as it was contrary 
to I.R.P.R. 1.7 which requires informed consent from Mr. Chippewa to proceed as 
counsel. There is no question about waiver in this matter as Mr. Chippewa alleged that 
he requested new counsel. (R., pp.4-9.) 
In sum, Mr. Chippewa established uncontroverted facts to support his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims based on two conflicts of interest. Therefore, the district 
court erred when it summarily dismissed these claims as they should have been further 
developed at an evidentiary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Chippewa respectfully requests that this case be remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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